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1. Introduction 
 
Since 1997, the Spanish Autonomous Communities (hereafter, the Communities) have 
the right to modify certain aspects of some of the taxes that are owned, and had been 
therefore traditionally regulated, by the Central State (hereafter, the State). These taxes 
are called ceded taxes, although the term is probably inadequate, as they are not actually 
ceded, but delegated to the Communities. As a result, some ceded taxes are in practice 
co-regulated by the State and the Communities, although the first holds greater powers 
to adopt legislation affecting them. Co-regulation requires a great amount of 
coordination, so as to not to erode the original structure of these taxes, which might 
eventually lead to them ceasing to serve their function within the tax system. 
 
If we analyse the legislation passed by the Communities on ceded taxes since 1997, we 
will easily draw the conclusion that, in most cases, they have used their brand new 
legislative powers on formerly State-only owned taxes, to reduce the tax burden for 
taxpayers. Moreover, in some cases, the coordination between the legislation adopted by 
the Communities and the State is not all that perfect2.  
 
This article deals with one of these problematic cases, namely, the reforms of the 
Property Transfers and Stamp Duty Tax3 (hereafter, PTSDT), that, at least at first sight, 
aims to reallocate part of the revenues that would otherwise accrue to the State in the 
                                                 
1 Department of Tax and Finance Law, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid violeta@der-pu.uc3m.es, 
http://www.uc3m.es/uc3m/dpto/PU/dppu04/violetar.html.  
2 V. RUIZ ALMENDRAL: “Impuestos cedidos y corresponsabilidad fiscal”. PhD Thesis. Forthcoming 
at: Valencia: Tirant lo blanch, 2003, pp. 299-429. 
3 “Impuesto sobre Transmisiones Patrimoniales y Actos Jurídicos Documentados”. 
Violeta Ruiz Almendral 
International Vat Monitor (IBFD). Vol. 14, no. 5. Sept/Oct. 2003 (pp. 373-380). 
 
 
                                                
form of VAT. However, when we analyse the relationship between these two taxes, we 
come to the conclusion that such reallocation will almost always fail. 
 
In order to put forward the problem in the clearest possible way, I will first very briefly 
explain what these ceded (or shared) taxes consist of. Secondly, I will describe the 
relationship between PTSDT and VAT. Finally, I will explain how the Communities 
take advantage of that relationship in order to increase their tax revenues. 
 
2. Delegation of legislative powers to the Communities 
 
2.1. Limited taxation powers of the Communities until 1997 
 
The Spanish Constitution bestows taxation powers upon the Communities (Secs. 133 
and 157) but enables the State to limit them through a special law (Sec. 157(3)). The 
State made use of this power as early as 1980 by adopting the Autonomous Regions 
Finance Act4, which imposes severe limits on the creation of new taxes by the 
Communities. The most important limitation is the prohibition of double taxation, 
which prevents Community taxes from being similar to State and Municipal taxes. As 
these two bodies had already established taxes on almost every possible source of 
revenue, little room was left for Community taxes. Moreover, the Constitutional Court 
has often broadly interpreted these limits5, making it almost impossible for the 
Communities to introduce new taxes. Therefore, despite Constitutional provisions that 
guarantee Communities both the power to establish taxes and financial autonomy (Sec. 
156(1)), the limits established by the State have led to a system where taxation powers 
remained mostly in the hands of the latter6. It is not always clear whether it is the 
limitations on establishing new taxes, or the unwillingness to withstand the political 
consequences of increasing the tax burden, that has deterred Communities from creating 
 
4 Original title: Ley Orgánica 8/1980, de Financiación de las Comunidades Autónomas, of 22 September 
1980. 
5 For example, Decision 289/2000. Decisions of the Spanish Constitutional Court can be found at 
www.tribunalconstitucional.es. 
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6 J.J. ZORNOZA PÉREZ: Los recursos de las Comunidades Autónomas. Cuadernos y Debates, No. 8. 
Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, Madrid, 1996, p. 23 et seq., and V. RUIZ ALMENDRAL: “Fiscal 
Federalism in Spain: the Assignment of Taxation Powers to the Autonomous Communities”, International 
Bureau of Fiscal Documentation, European Taxation, Vol. 42, No. 11, November 2002. 
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new taxes. In any case, this situation underlines the importance of intergovernmental 
transfers in Spain, and the continuing existence of a substantial imbalance between the 
Communities’ spending power – which has been strongly supported by the 
Constitutional Court (for example, in Decision 13/1992) – and their limited power to 
raise their own revenues.  
 
The financial dependence of the Communities was not a problem in the early years of 
the State of Autonomies, as back then Communities were regarded with a certain 
distrust, and some of their attempts to establish taxes were severely rejected by voters 
(such as happened in the Community of Madrid, in the late eighties). As time passed, 
the Communities gradually gained more responsibilities and their financial needs grew 
substantially. This resulted in a gradual expansion of the transfer system, and a more 
financially dependent position of the Communities.  
 
Soon, debates about the Communities’ fiscal responsibility became one of the main 
issues in the relationship between the State and the Communities. From the beginning, 
there was a certain general agreement in that it was fiscal responsibility “at the 
margin”7, as opposed to total equivalence between income and expenditures, the 
objective to attain. The responsibility of subnational tiers of government to generate 
income/funds in addition to what they obtain from the State in the form of financial 
transfers, in order to be able to finance improvements in the provision of public 
services, has been considered a substantial requirement for any decentralization of 
powers8. Moreover, the transfer of at least some taxation powers to the said tiers of 
government has also been considered essential in order to implement a certain level of 
political autonomy. In this sense, it has been said that if the most essential principle in 
matters of taxation is the guarantee that the institutions that establish them have a 
democratic representation, which has been traditionally expressed through the maxim 
“No Taxation without Representation, the basic principle in the decentralization of 
 
7 D. HEALD and N. GEAUGHAM: “Financing a Scottish Parliament”. (Ed.: S. TINDALE): The State 
and the Nations, Institute for Public Policy Research, London, 1996, p. 173 et seq. 
 
 
 
 
3
8 A. CASTELLS OLIVERES: Hacienda Autonómica, Una perspectiva de Federalismo Fiscal, Ariel, 
Barcelona, 1988, p. 75.; J. RAMALLO MASSANET: “El reparto de competencias tributarias entre los 
distintos ámbitos de gobierno”. Revista Española de Derecho Financiero, No. 60, 1988, pp. 534-535; J.J. 
ZORNOZA PÉREZ, see note 6, pp. 20 et seq.; and C.E. McLURE Jr.: “Tax Assignment and Subnational 
Fiscal Autonomy”, Bulletin, IBFD, Vol. 54, No. 12, 2000, pp. 634 et seq. 
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authority in a multilevel government may be expressed with the saying: “No 
Representation without Taxation”9. 
 
2.2. 1996 and 2001 Reforms  
 
Eventually, in September 1996, there was a major reform in the regional finance system, 
and the Communities were granted significant legislative powers over ceded taxes. The 
main objective of the reform was to make Communities as responsible for the revenues 
they raised as they already were for those they spent -thus decreasing what in fiscal 
federalism literature is known as “vertical fiscal imbalance”, which is the situation that 
arises when one tier of government has the power to obtain a larger amount of revenues 
than it needs for financing its dependent authorities10. 
 
Until then, ceded taxes had been State taxes whose yield was granted to the 
Communities according to the taxes paid within their territory. Due to powers delegated 
by the State, the Communities had also taken on the responsibility of administering 
these taxes. Ceded taxes were then a kind of transfer, by which some of the taxes owned 
and entirely regulated by the State were transferred to and administered by the 
Communities. In order to give the Communities more room for taxation, a reform was 
enacted giving these taxes quite a different meaning than they had had until then. First, 
the Personal Income Tax became a ceded tax –albeit only partially. Second, the power 
to regulate some aspects of these taxes – mainly tax brackets, tax rates and some tax 
credits – was conferred on the Communities. This was done by way of delegation of 
legislative powers by the State to the Communities, something which – unlike in other 
federations – is allowed by the Spanish Constitution (Sec. 150). Such delegation implies 
that the State can both control the powers exercised by Communities and revoke them at 
 
9 D. HEALD, N. GEAUGHAN, and C. ROBB: “Financial Arrangements for UK Devolution”, Regional 
and Federal Studies, Vol. 8, No. 1/1998 (Special Issue: Remaking the Union, Devolution and British 
Politics in the 1990s, Eds.: H. ELCOCK and M. KEATING, 1998, pp. 28 et seq. 
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10 R.W. BOADWAY: “The Economics of Equalization”, AA.VV., Eds. R.W. BOADWAY and P.A.R. 
HOBSON: Equalization: Its Contribution to Canadá’s Economic and Fiscal Progress, John Deutsch 
Institute for the Study of Economic Policy, Queen’s University, Kingston, 1998, pp. 46 et seq. 
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any time11. However, it is very probable that the exercise of this power by the State 
would create too much stress on the financial relations between these two tiers of 
government. For this reason, the new powers of Communities regarding ceded taxes are 
probably, in practice, irrevocable.  
 
Following this reform, the revenues from ceded taxes still accrue to the Communities on 
the basis of taxes paid by their residents. But now, should a Community exercise its new 
legislative powers, the revenues will be the result of the Community’s own taxing 
autonomy. What until 1997 had been a form of transfer has become a form of tax 
sharing12.  
 
In 1997, the Communities were given legislative powers to regulate certain aspects of 
the following taxes: 
 
 
 
Ceded Taxes as of 1 January 1997 
 
 
Ceded Taxes 
Revenue accruing 
to Communities 
 
Administration 
 
Legislative Power that Communities 
may take on 
 
Personal Income 
Tax 
 
33% 
 
State 
• Tax rates (the number of tax 
brackets must remain the same as 
under the State tax) 
• Tax credits, under certain 
conditions  
 
Tax on Wealth 
 
100% 
 
Communities 
• Tax rates (the number of tax 
brackets must remain the same as 
under the State tax) 
• Minimal deduction 
 
Death and Gift 
Taxes 
 
100% 
 
Communities 
 
• Reductions of the taxable income. 
• Tax rates 
 
 
Property Transfer 
Tax and Stamp 
Duty 
 
 
100% 
 
Communities 
 
• Tax rates 
   • Exemptions 
                                                 
11 M. MUÑOZ MACHADO: Derecho Público de las Comunidades Autónomas, II, Civitas, Madrid, 1984, 
pp. 459 et seq.; J.A. SANTAMARÍA PASTOR: Fundamentos de Derecho Administrativo I, Centro de 
Estudios Ramón Areces, Madrid, 1988, p. 599. 
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12 J.J. ZORNOZA PÉREZ: “Corresponsabilidad fiscal y financiación de las Comunidades Autónomas: el 
modelo para el quinquenio 1997-2001”, Eds. Jiménez-Blanco and Martínez Simancas: El Estado de las 
Autonomías, Vol. IV., CEURA, Madrid, 1997. 
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Gambling Taxes 
 
100% 
 
Communities 
• Taxable base 
• Tax rates 
• Tax credits 
• Tax administration regulations 
 
 
In July 2001, the Communities and the State agreed to broaden the scope of ceded taxes, 
which gave room for a substantial legislative reform13. As a result, the Communities’ 
legislative powers to amend some taxes have increased, and new taxes have been ceded 
to them. The asymmetry between the different ceded taxes is now larger than ever. This 
means that depending on the tax, the yield will totally or partially accrue to 
Communities, which may or may not take on legislative powers, and may or may not be 
in charge of the administration of the tax. Thus, depending on the tax, the powers 
conferred to Communities vary so widely, that in some cases the ceded tax operates as a 
mere transfer, such as VAT, while in other cases, the broad scope of the Communities' 
powers makes the ceded tax very similar to an autonomous tax, such as the Gambling 
Taxes. A general outline of the new legislative powers can be seen in the following 
chart: 
 
 
Ceded Taxes as of 1 January 2002 
 
Ceded Taxes Revenue accruing 
to Communities 
Administration Legislative Power that Communities may 
take on 
 
Personal Income 
Tax 
 
33% 
 
State 
• Tax rates (the number of tax brackets 
must remain the same as under the State 
tax) 
• Tax credits, under certain conditions  
 
Tax on Wealth 
 
100% 
 
Communities 
• Tax rates 
• Minimal deduction 
• Tax credits 
 
Death and Gift 
Taxes 
 
100% 
 
Communities 
• Reductions of the taxable income 
• Tax rates 
• Deductions and tax credits 
• Tax administration regulations 
Property Transfer 
Tax and Stamp 
Duty 
 
100% 
 
Communities 
• Tax rates 
• Tax credits 
• Tax administration regulations 
 
 
Gambling Taxes 
 
 
100% 
 
 
Communities 
• Exemptions 
• Taxable base 
• Tax rates 
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13 Carried out, among other, by the State Law No. 21/2001 of 27 December 2001. (Original title: Ley 
21/2001, de 27 de diciembre, por la que se regulan las medidas fiscales y administrativas del nuevo 
sistema de financiación de las Comunidades Autónomas de régimen común y Ciudades con Estatuto de 
autonomía). 
Violeta Ruiz Almendral 
International Vat Monitor (IBFD). Vol. 14, no. 5. Sept/Oct. 2003 (pp. 373-380). 
 
 
• Tax credits 
• Tax administration regulations 
VAT 35% State None 
Excise 40% State None 
Tax On Wine  40% State None 
Tax on Electricity  100% State None 
Tax on Vehicles 100% Communities • Tax rates (under certain conditions and 
limits) 
Special tax on 
Gas  
100% Communities • Tax rates (under certain conditions and 
limits) 
• Tax administration regulations 
 
 
The Communities are free to choose whether they want to exercise their regulatory 
powers. This is consistent with the so-called “optional autonomy principle” (“principio 
dispositivo”) that is implicitly assimilated in the Spanish Constitution. Under that 
principle, each Community may decide what powers and authorities it wants to take 
on14. In the absence of Community initiatives, the State regulates every aspect of the 
ceded taxes. If a Community decides to exercise regulatory powers over any ceded tax, 
it may do so by adopting legislation that replaces the State law in those aspects where 
the Community can legislate. For instance, in the case of the Tax on Wealth (where 
Communities may set the tax rates), the tax rates set by the State legislation only applies 
to residents in those Communities that decided not to set their own tax rates. The way 
that this principle has been structured – and the fact that the State still guarantees 
Communities lump-sum grants allocated on the basis of historical shares in State 
transfers – creates a strong disincentive for Communities to use their new taxation 
powers. Proof of this disincentive is the fact that, since 1997, Communities have mainly 
used their powers to create new fiscal benefits – assuring that they will be seen by 
taxpayers as the “Fairy Godmothers” offering services to citizens without asking for 
money in exchange, while the taxing role of “Wicked Stepmother” is played by the 
State. 
 
So although there has been a reassignment of taxation powers, and Communities now 
have more room than they ever had for designing their own taxation policies, they still 
prefer to rely mainly on State transfers. In 2000, conditional and unconditional transfers 
still represented (roughly) 60% of the Communities' total revenues and the yield derived 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
7
14 DE OTTO Y PARDO, I: Derecho constitucional: sistema de fuentes, Ariel, Barcelona, 1995, p. 256. 
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from ceded taxes represented 25%. However, if we take into account that most ceded 
taxes act as “transfers” when the Communities do not exercise any regulatory powers on 
the tax rates, we must conclude that transfers from the State still represented about 85% 
of Communities’ total revenues, as most of them had only exercised their powers to 
create new tax benefits. Taking into account that they are in charge of almost 40% of 
total expenditure, the fiscal imbalance is obvious. Thus, as I have said before, if one of 
the reasons for the reform was to increase the Communities’ fiscal responsibility and 
make them more accountable to taxpayers for the money they spend, it has failed to 
attain its goal. It remains to be seen whether the most recent increase of the Community 
taxation powers will help to change this situation. This shall not be easy, as the 
incentive problems just described remain largely the same in the laws putting the new 
agreements into practice15. 
 
So far, the only exception has been the PTSDT. Since 1997, when Communities were 
granted the power to set their own tax rates, most Communities have increased the tax 
burden of these taxes. As can be seen in the chart, Communities are entitled to the 
revenue of these taxes in their respective territories. They are also in charge of 
collection of the tax, and, since 2002, may also establish tax credits. 
 
3. The Communities’ legislation on PTSDT 
 
3.1. Tax Rates of PTSDT 
 
The PTSDT is a complex tax that actually consists of three different taxes. The first is 
the Property Transfer Tax16, which puts a 6% tax on the acquisition value of immovable 
property, unless the supply is subject to VAT. The Communities have the power to 
increase or decrease the tax rate. So far, almost all Communities have increased it to 
7%.  
 
The second tax is the Stamp Duty17. The tax burden depends on three factors: 
 
15 V. RUIZ ALMENDRAL, see note 6, p. 475. 
16 “Impuesto sobre Transmisiones Patrimoniales”. 
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− the value of the transaction, 
− the number of sheets of paper of the notarial deed or official document reflecting it, 
and 
− whether or not the transaction is subject to Property Transfer Tax or VAT. 
The Stamp Duty has two rates: a fixed rate of EUR 0.30 per sheet, and a proportional 
rate of 0.5% of the declared value of the property. The proportional rate only applies 
when the transaction is not subject to Property Transfer Tax, which will be the case 
when the transaction is subject to VAT. 
The Communities only have legislative powers to increase or decrease the proportional 
tax rate. So far, almost all Communities have increased it to 1%. 
 
Property Transfer Tax and Stamp Duty rates for immovable property (to be 
applied on the declared value) 
 
Property Transfer Tax Stamp Duty 
State’s tax rate 
 
(applicable in: 
Canarias, 
Castilla-La 
Mancha and 
Castilla y León) 
Communities’ tax rate 
 
(applicable in Andalucía, 
Aragón, Asturias, Baleares, 
Cantabria, Cataluña, 
Extremadura, Galicia, Madrid, 
Murcia, La Rioja and 
Comunidad Valenciana) 
State’s tax rate 
 
(applicable in: 
Baleares, Canarias, 
Castilla-La Mancha, 
Castilla y León, 
Murcia and La Rioja) 
Communities’ tax rate 
 
(applicable in Andalucía, 
Aragón, Asturias, 
Cantabria, Cataluña18, 
Extremadura, Galicia, 
Madrid and Comunidad 
Valenciana) 
EUR 0.30 per sheet of official paper  
6% 
 
7% 0.5% 1% 
 
 
The third tax is the Corporation Transactions Tax19, which taxes operations or 
transactions undertaken by Corporations, such as increases in capital, mergers, etc. The 
tax is of little interest in the context of this article, as the Communities have no power to 
amend it, and will not be discussed.  
 
                                                 
18 A special case is Cataluña, that in 2001 established a progresive rate in the Stamp Duty, as follows: 
 
Taxable value (EUR) Tax rate 
0-30,000 0.5% 
30,001-60,000 0.75% 
> 60,000 1% 
 
 
 
 
 
9
19 “Impuesto sobre Operaciones Societarias”. 
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3.2. The relationship between PTSDT and VAT 
 
The relationship between PTSDT and VAT depends on the taxes that are embedded in 
the PTSDT. The Community legislation that we will deal with here, takes advantage of 
that relationship, which will first be analyzed. 
 
With respect to the Property Transfer Tax, the general rule is that transactions that are 
subject to VAT are not subject to Property Transfer Tax20. Under Sec. 7.5 of the PTSDT 
Act, Property Transfer Tax only applies to transactions that are within the scope of 
VAT, but are declared exempt from it under the provisions of the VAT Act21. Such 
VAT exemption applies to the supply of used immovable property, unless the property 
has been renovated.  
 
Due to the special structure of VAT, taxable persons may prefer to waive the exemption 
of the supply of immovable property and pay VAT, instead of Property Transfer Tax. At 
first sight, it may seem strange that taxpayers prefer to waive a tax exemption, but it is 
perfectly logical within the system of VAT, as taxpayers that are engaged in 
transactions that are exempt from VAT are not entitled to recover any input tax relating 
to those transactions. On the other hand, when the transaction is not exempt from VAT, 
the supplier is entitled to deduct the tax paid on goods and services used for the 
purposes of making that transaction from the tax payable on their output.  
 
The possibility to waive a VAT exemption is not an individual benefit, but a means to 
maintain the neutrality of the tax with respect to business transactions22. For this reason, 
the VAT Act establishes special and strict conditions for waiving VAT exemptions23. 
First, it will only be permitted for certain operations, such as sale of used immovable 
property. Second, it will only be accepted when the buyer is also a trader, who is buying 
 
20 Sec. 7(5) of the Law regulating the PTSDT; Act (Texto Refundido) No. 1/1993 of 24 September 1993. 
21 Act No. 37/1992 of 28 December 1992.  
22 A. ASPICHUETA GRIJELMO: “La renuncia a las exenciones inmobiliarias del IVA”, Crónica 
Tributaria, No. 181, 1993, p. 3. 
 
 
 
 
10
23 J.M. TEJERIZO LÓPEZ: “Los conflictos de aplicación normativa: Impuesto sobre el Valor Añadido 
versus Impuesto sobre Transmisiones Patrimoniales”, Revista de Información Fiscal, 2001, p. 33; and J. 
RODRÍGUEZ MÁRQUEZ: “El Impuesto sobre el Valor Añadido en las Operaciones Inmobiliarias”, 
Cuadernos de Jurisprudencia Tributaria, No. 24, Aranzadi, Navarra, 2002, pp. 46 et seq. 
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the property for business purposes and has the right to deduct VAT. Finally, the buyer 
must be informed of the waiver, which will usually be done through the notarial deed 
that reflects the transaction. It is relevant to recall here that such deed is usually subject 
to Stamp Duty. This way of aligning VAT and PTSDT is not exclusive for Spain, but 
constitutes a common practice in numerous countries24. 
 
3.3. Communities taking advantage of the relationship between VAT and PTSDT 
 
As I have said above, the Communities have the power to set their own tax rates for 
Property Transfers Tax and Stamp Duty. For the latter, such power only affects the 
deeds and official documents relating to transactions that are not subject to Property 
Transfer Tax, i.e. that are subject to VAT. 
 
Since 1997, some Communities have established reduced tax rates in certain cases 
where they are able to take on revenues that would normally accrue to the State in the 
form of VAT. This has been done by increasing the rates in the Stamp Duty, and 
decreasing them in the Property Transfer Tax, in order to encourage or discourage the 
waiver of the VAT exemption. Thus, when a transaction in used immovable property is 
exempt from VAT, and the conditions to waive the exemption (opt for taxation) are 
fulfilled, a lower Property Transfer Tax applies if the supplier does not opt for taxation. 
Likewise, a higher rate of Stamp Duty will be applicable if the supplier exercises the 
option for taxation.  
 
The first Community to establish these different tax rates was Aragón in 2001. 
Catalonia, Madrid and La Rioja followed in 2002. Finally, the Communities of 
Andalusia, Asturias, Baleares, Cantabria and Extremadura adopted similar measures in 
2003. A feasible explanation for this copycat behaviour lies in the fact that the 
Communities are fully aware that such legislation is only just within the boundaries of 
the lawfulness. Thus, they prefer not to implement such measures until they are certain 
that they will not encounter any legal problems. This explanation may seem too simple, 
but it is not if we are aware that this kind of behaviour is actually very common among 
 
24 A.A. TAIT: Value Added Tax, International Practice and Problems, International Monetary Fund, 
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Communities. A good example of this is the way Community taxes are often 
introduced. When a Community introduces a new tax, the others pay very close 
attention to its structure and the way the new tax is received by the State. If it is 
considered an attractive means to obtaining more revenues, i.e. it is easy to administer, 
does not cause too strong popular opposition, etc., and the State’s reaction is not too 
harsh, i.e. the introduction of the tax is not challenged by the State before the 
Constitutional Court or even if it is, the legal arguments for the lawsuit are not 
considered very strong, the other Communities may introduce a similar, in most cases 
identical, tax. Normally, Communities will wait for at least a year to see what the 
State’s reaction will be. Examples of this behaviour are: in 1991, Baleares introduced a 
tax on certain facilities that may affect the environment25. Only six years later, 
Extremadura adopted an identical tax26. More recently, in 2000, Cataluña introduced a 
tax on certain shopping areas, such as big supermarkets27. The year after, Navarra 
adopted a similar tax and Asturias followed that example in 200328. 
 
In view of the preceding examples, it is not surprising that the Communities have acted 
the same way with respect to PTSDT. The result is almost identical Community 
legislation which, in this case, only differs in one or two percentage points, as can be 
seen in the following chart: 
 
 
Community 
Special tax rates in Stamp Duty 
(State’s rate: 0.5%) 
 
To be applied when the supplier 
opts for VAT 
 
Special tax rates in Property 
Transfer Tax 
(State’s rate: 6%) 
 
To be applied when all conditions 
for the option for VAT are 
fulfilled, but the supplier does not 
exercise the option 
Andalucía 2% - 
Aragón 1.5% 2% 
Asturias 1.5% 2% 
Baleares 1.5% 3% 
                                                                                                                                               
Washington DC, 1988, p. 65. 
25 Impuesto sobre determinadas instalaciones que inciden en el Medio Ambiente. 
26 These two taxes were established, respectively, by Law No. 19/1991 of 20 December 1991 (Baleares), 
and by Law No. 7/1997 of 29 May 1997 (Extremadura). The Balearic tax was declared void by the 
Constitutional Court (Decision 289/2000). Although the ruling cannot be extended to the tax established 
by Extremadura, this probably explains why no other Community has created another similar tax. 
27 Impuesto sobre Grandes Establecimientos Comerciales. 
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28 The laws regulating these three taxes are: Law No. 16/2000 of 19 December 2000 (Cataluña); Law No. 
23/2001, (Navarra) and Law No. 15/2002 of 27 December 2002 (Asturias). 
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Cantabria 1.5% 4% 
Cataluña 1.5% - 
Extremadura 2% 3% 
La Rioja 1.5% 2% 
Madrid 1.5% - 
 
 
The following example may serve to clarify the relationship between VAT and PTSDT. 
 
A and B are both traders in the property development business. B buys a used house 
from A for EUR 200,000 for the purpose of transforming it into a residence and 
subsequently sells it to a third party. All conditions for exercising the option for taxation 
are fulfilled, including the express acceptance by B. The transaction is reflected in a 
notarial deed that has seven sheets of paper. 
 
The tax consequences of this transaction vary considerably depending on whether A 
exercises the option for taxation and whether Community legislation applies. 
 
First scenario: A opts for taxation 
Supplier A opts for taxation and charges VAT to B. In addition, B must pay Stamp 
Duty. 
 
− VAT: The tax rate for housing is 7%, so the amount of VAT that will be charged to 
B is (EUR 200,000 x 7%) EUR 14,000. That amount will be deductible from B's 
output VAT.  
 
− Stamp Duty: The tax burden for Stamp Duty will be as follows: 
 
− A fixed tax rate of EUR 0.30 per sheet of official paper: 7 x EUR 0.30 = EUR 
2,10.  
 
− Because the transaction is subject to VAT, the deed is also subject to Stamp 
Duty at the proportional rate. The Communities may set that rate. 
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In the absence of Community legislation, the State’s tax rate of 0.5% will be 
applicable. The amount of Stamp Duty is (EUR 200,000 x 0.5%) EUR 1,000.  
 
If Community legislation applies, the amount of Stamp Duty will be 
substantially higher, and, therefore, constitutes a "penalty" on the option. The 
tax rate would be 1.5% in the Communities of Asturias, Aragón, Balearic 
Islands, Cantabria, Catalonia, Madrid and La Rioja, and 2% in Andalusia and 
Extremadura.  
 
Therefore, depending on the Community where the property is located, the tax 
burden will be: 
 
Stamp Duty Communities 
Rate Amount 
Andalucía 2% EUR 4,000 
Aragón 1.5% EUR 3,000 
Asturias 1.5% EUR 3,000 
Baleares 1.5% EUR 3,000 
Canarias 0.5% EUR 1,000 
Cantabria 1.5% EUR 3,000 
Castilla y León 0.5% EUR 1,000 
Castilla-La Mancha 0.5% EUR 1,000 
Cataluña 1.5% EUR 3,000 
Comunidad Valenciana 0.5% EUR 1,000 
Extremadura 2% EUR 4,000 
Galicia 0.5% EUR 1,000 
La Rioja 1.5% EUR 3,000 
Madrid 1.5% EUR 3,000 
Murcia 0.5% EUR 1,000 
 
 
Second scenario: A does not opt for taxation 
Although all conditions for the option for taxation are fulfilled, A decides not to waive 
the VAT exemption. Consequently, purchaser B will have to pay Property Transfer Tax 
and the fixed rate of the Stamp Duty. 
 
− Property Transfer Tax:  
− In the absence of Community legislation, the State’s tax rate, which amounts to 
6%, will be applicable. 
 
 
 
 
14
Violeta Ruiz Almendral 
International Vat Monitor (IBFD). Vol. 14, no. 5. Sept/Oct. 2003 (pp. 373-380). 
 
 
− If Community legislation is applicable, the tax burden will be substantially 
lower, as it aims to encourage taxable persons not to waive the VAT 
exemption. The tax rate will be 2% (for Aragón, Asturias and La Rioja), 3% 
(for Balearic Islands and Extremadura) or 4% (in Cantabria). 
 
Therefore, depending on the Community where the property is located, the tax 
burden will be: 
 
Property Transfer Tax Communities 
Rate Amount 
Andalucía 6% EUR 12,000 
Aragón 2% EUR 4,000 
Asturias 2% EUR 4,000 
Baleares 3% EUR 6,000 
Canarias 6% EUR 12,000 
Cantabria 4% EUR 8,000 
Castilla y León 6% EUR 12,000 
Castilla-La Mancha 6% EUR 12,000 
Cataluña 6% EUR 12,000 
Comunidad Valenciana 6% EUR 12,000 
Extremadura 3% EUR 6,000 
Galicia 6% EUR 12,000 
La Rioja 2% EUR 4,000 
Madrid 6% EUR 12,000 
Murcia 6% EUR 12,000 
 
 
− Stamp Duty: 
− A fixed tax rate of EUR 0.30 per sheet of official paper: 7 x EUR 0.30 = EUR 
2,10. 
− As the transaction is subject to Property Transfer Tax, it is not subject to Stamp 
Duty at the proportional rate.  
 
4. Evaluation of the Community tax measures 
 
Having examined the two scenarios, the question rises: when will the second scenario 
be a good option for the taxpayers? According to the VAT logic, the answer is crystal 
clear: never. Lower rates of the Property Transfer Tax do not constitute an adequate 
incentive not to waive the VAT exemption. The second scenario is an unrealistic choice, 
for it implies that they lose the right to deduct input VAT.  
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The next question would be: why have the Communities reduced the rate of the 
Property Transfer Tax? There does not seem to be a clear answer to this question. The 
Community legislation that reduced those rates does not provide an indication as to why 
such measures have been adopted. Furthermore, it is also quite surprising that the 
Communities are still establishing different rates in PTSDT in order to attract the VAT 
revenues, considering that, since January 2002, 35% of VAT revenues accrue to them. 
Why should they adopt legislation whose objective it is to reduce VAT revenues in 
favour of PTSDT? A possible explanation for this is that, as opposed to PTSDT, they 
receive VAT revenues in an indirect way. While PTSDT revenues accrue to 
Communities on the basis of criteria that are directly linked to the territory, such as the 
place where the immovable property is located, VAT is transferred to the Communities 
on the basis of statistical data relating to the average consumption in a given 
Community as provided by the National Statistics Institute (Instituto Nacional de 
Estadística). That criterion is quite similar to that employed in other federations, for 
example, the Canadian Harmonized Federal-Provincial Sales Tax29. This tax is 
collected by the Federation and then distributed among the Provinces using the criterion 
of the aggregate consumption, as calculated by Statistics Canada3031.  
 
At any rate, although the above legislation will probably fail to actually obtain further 
revenues in the form of Property Transfer Tax, it is in my view clear that it still creates 
confusion for the taxpayer, that may be deluded to think that not waiving the exemption 
could represent a benefit, when it is clearly not so. It is not, however, a clear case of tax 
competition or piracy, for it is unrealistic to believe that taxpayers would opt for 
taxation under the Property Transfer Tax in the circumstances explained above. 
 
With respect to the proportional rate of the Stamp Duty, the conclusion must be 
different. The increased rate that applies where the taxpayer legitimately opts to waive 
 
29 So far, only the Provinces of New Brunswick, Newfoundland and Nova Scotia have entered into the 
HST system, by which, starting with a flat rate of 15%, 7 points accrue to the Federation and the other 8 
to the Provinces. 
30 Statistics Act, 1985, chapter S-19 Canada Statutes.  
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the VAT exemption, may, in my view, constitute a way of tampering with the VAT 
option. In short, Communities obtain a benefit, in the form of higher revenues, which 
derives from the exercise of an option –the waiver of the VAT exemption - that forms 
part of the VAT system. In this respect, I believe it feasible to maintain that the 
Community legislation may imply an infringement of the Spanish Constitution, and, in 
an indirect way, of the laws that bestow taxation powers to the Communities, and of the 
Sixth Directive. 
 
Possibly, the main argument to maintain the unconstitutionality of the Community 
provisions, is an infringement of the solidarity principle, enshrined in Secs. 2 and 156(2) 
of the Constitution. As interpreted by the Spanish Constitutional Court, the solidarity 
principle implies the interdiction for the Communities to “take or carry out decisions 
that harm the general interest of the Nation”, and it compels them to take into account 
“the community of interests that bind them together” (Opinion No. 64/1990, FJ. 7th). 
Thus, as the Court put it, one of the main aspects of the solidarity principle is the 
realization of the “duty of loyalty to the Constitution” (Opinion No. 11/1986, FJ. 5th). 
 
As the Spanish Constitutional Court has acknowledged, the interpretation of the 
solidarity principle is, to a certain extent, equivalent to the German “Bundestreue”, or to 
the Italian principle of “leale collaborazione”32. The Bundestreue is based upon the idea 
that the “federal structure implies the combination of two tiers of government that 
support mutually each other”33, and imposes the obligation, for both the Bund and the 
Länder, to take into account the general or common interests, in order to guarantee both 
a certain unity and the basic harmony of the system34.  
 
In a nutshell, and according to numerous Decisions of the Spanish Constitutional Court 
on this matter, the solidarity principle implies obligations, both for the Communities 
and for the State, that go well beyond the formal legal framework. Thus, in the exercise 
 
32 F. PUZZO: Il federalismo fiscale, L’esperienza italiana e spagnola nella prospettiva comunitaria, 
Giuffrè, Milano, 1995, pp. 70-71. 
33 H.A. SCHWARZ-LIEBERMANN VON WAHLENDORF: “Une notion capitale du Droit 
Constitutionnel Allemand: la bundestreue (fidélité fédérale)”, Revue du Droit Public (France), 1979, p. 
770. 
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of their legislative powers on ceded taxes, the Communities must respect not only the 
formal framework that sets the boundaries for their powers, but also its spirit, which 
implies the obligation of respecting the rest of the tax system. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Although they will probably fail to affect the exercise of the option to waive the VAT 
exemption, the Community provisions on PTSDT, in particular, Stamp Duty, provide 
the Communities with a benefit that is beyond the spirit of the law, and constitute an 
undue extra burden for taxpayers as well. In making it “more expensive” to waive the 
VAT exemption, it is an indirect way of tampering with the neutrality of the VAT 
system. 
 
Because the Community provisions on Stamp Duty do not aim to directly compete in a 
clear and transparent way, they probably do not fall in the category of “Tax 
competition”, but in another category, which I would call “Tax piracy”. Tax 
competition is traditionally understood as the behaviour of certain States or subnational 
governments, to attract taxable transactions from other jurisdictions by reducing the tax 
burden, i.e., in order to compete with other countries or tiers of government the tax 
system is made more attractive to taxpayers35. Although the Community provisions on 
PTSDT do not directly affect the relationship with the State or other Communities, they 
punish or reward the behaviour of taxable persons in the context of VAT. The taxable 
person's choice to apply or waive the VAT exemption should not be influenced by 
Community tax measures, as this choice merely serves to maintain the neutrality of the 
VAT system. Therefore, although the means are different – the Communities take 
advantage of choices that taxpayers make for VAT purposes only -, the results are 
identical to those of tax competition: they generate greater tax revenues for the 
Communities.  
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